



























The paper estimates the political connection premium for Italian cities tracked during the second
half of the 1900s, when the role of the state in the economy was very widespread. It leverages
the peculiar features of the gridlocked political landscape in place between the end of World
War II and the fall of the Berlin wall, during which most influential politicians remained in
charge for a very long time. We compare connected cities – small areas surrounding birthplaces
of both prime ministers and leaders of the parties in power – with very similar, but unconnected
municipalities, and find that politically connected cities gained a population premium of 8%
over 40 years. When the connection ends, the difference in growth rate fades away. We doc-
ument that birthplaces of powerful politicians benefited from both infrastructure investments
and the location of plants by state-owned enterprises. Not surprisingly, the connection favored
industrialization, raised employment and wages, but crowded out private entrepreneurship. Fi-
nally, our empirical evidence indicates that agglomeration economies in treated municipalities
were not higher, thus suggesting that, if anything, place-based interventions linked to political
connections have not been output-enhancing from a nationwide point of view.
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Non-technical summary
Political economy literature has recently documented that politicians do favor some targeted places
by means of pork barrel transfers, asymmetric public good provision (e.g. infrastructures), location
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, much less is known about the consequences of regional
favoritism in terms of economic growth. This paper documents the effects of regional favoritism
in a developed country, providing also evidence about the persistence of the effects and on the
spatial allocative optimality. We exploit the peculiar Italian institutional background between
the end of WWII and the fall of the Berlin wall. At the beginning of this period, known in the
journalistic and political jargon as First Republic, a completely new political system emerged: the
end of the Fascist dictatorship led its way to a political system grounded on five political parties
sharing an anti-communist stance and ruling for all the period. The stability of such a scenario
was essentially based on Cold War and on the fear that the Italian Communist Party, the strongest
among Western countries, could win regular elections and take power. Then, in the first part of the
nineties, this system suddenly collapsed. The fall of the Berlin wall made the communist threat
obsolete, mitigating the political pressures to keep the ruling parties in power. Shortly after, a
massive judicial investigation into political corruption of the governing parties induced a sharp
change in the political élites.
Against this historical background, we investigate the impact of political connections on pop-
ulation growth at the city level. We select population as dependent variable because it reflects
economic growth in small areas and has the advantage of being available and consistently mea-
sured over a long estimation window. Then, we define the set of powerful politicians as prime
ministers and leaders of the five parties in power between 1948 and 1992 and investigate whether
municipalities in their areas of birth experienced stronger population growth over the forty-year
period of the First Republic, with respect to untreated municipalities with similar characteristics at
the beginning of the period. Our findings indicate the existence of a sizeable connection premium,
equal to 8% over 40 years (18% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable). The abrupt
end of the treatment period in the first part of the nineties allows us to study persistence in the
following 20 years, from 1991 to 2011. The difference in population growth between treated and
control municipalities fades until it disappears, while the difference in levels of population accumu-
lated in the previous forty years remains stable. This suggests that the benefits provided by the
political connections are not permanent, even though the levels of population may be sluggish in
reverting to their original path, probably because the capital stock created may depreciate quite
slowly over time. This conclusion is reinforced by the existence of structural changes in the local
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economies of connected municipalities. We find that treated municipalities experienced improved
economic prosperity at the end of the period: at the sunset of the First Republic, they showed
greater industrialization (but not in the high-tech sectors), higher wages and employment rates.
The downside was a toll on some private sector activity: the share of entrepreneurs out of the total
number of workers was lower. Interestingly, after the connection ended, these structural differences
slowly disappeared. Also, when investigating the mechanisms behind such results, we find that
connected areas disproportionally benefitted from the post-WWII development of the transport
network and that state-owned enterprises were more likely to be located in their neighborhoods.
After documenting the local advantages deriving from political connections, we complete the
overall picture by turning to nationwide allocative considerations. Having favored some areas at
the expense of others does not necessarily point to economic inefficiency. For example, politicians
might have better inside information about the existence of higher agglomeration economies in
their hometowns. At the same time, the blocked political system and the fact that politicians were
destined to remain in power for long time might have favored forward-looking political choices.
Under these conditions, moving population and economic activity to connected places would have
brought to higher aggregate output. To check for this possibility, we test whether connected cities
displayed higher agglomeration economies and find that this not the case.
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1 Introduction
Between 1956 and 1964, in the midst of the economic boom, the Italian government built the most
important infrastructure of the country, i.e. the highway connecting the city of Milan, the main
economic center in the North, to the capital city, Rome, in the Central part of Italy. The most
convenient route passed through Siena, a middle-sized city between Florence and Rome. According
to an anecdotal story, the then Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, born near Arezzo, a city 70-km
east of Siena, decided to have the highway pass through Arezzo rather than Siena and drew this
deviation of the route with his red pencil on a map. With the so called “Fanfani bend” (Figure 1),
he was able to kill two birds with one stone: rewarding his electoral feud of Arezzo and inflicting
a blow to Siena, that was governed by the main opposition group, the Communist party.
Aside from such suggestive anecdotes, some papers have recently documented that politicians do
favor some targeted places by means of pork barrel transfers, asymmetrically public good provisions
(e.g. infrastructures), location of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This has been shown for both
democracies and autocracies, as well as for countries with different degrees of economic development
(Kahn et al., 2020; Carozzi and Repetto, 2016; Do et al., 2017; Fiva and Halse, 2016; Gehring and
Schneider, 2018; Gonschorek et al., 2018). However, much less is known about the consequences of
regional favoritism in terms of economic growth. Two notable exceptions are Hodler and Raschky
(2014), who look at a large sample of both developed and developing countries, and Asher and
Novosad (2017), who focus on India: both papers show that the positive bias of politicians towards
their hometowns translates into greater economic development for beneficiaries. Nevertheless, two
further relevant research questions remain unanswered. First, whether the growth in gains persists
after the end of the connection and, if not, whether there is a reversal in the level of economic
fortune. This is important to understand whether the greater benefits from regional favoritism can
permanently change the development trends of such regions. Second, what are the allocative distor-
tions induced by hometown bias. Indeed, while all the existing literature assumes that favoritism
implies some form of misallocation, it might also be the case that politicians have private infor-
mation on local development potential (e.g. in terms of higher agglomeration economies) of their
birthplaces, a case in which targeting public intervention to birthplaces would be output-enhancing
even at a national level.
This paper complements the existing literature documenting the effects of regional favoritism
in a developed country and providing evidence regarding the persistence of the benefits from con-
nections and the allocative bias induced. To do so, we exploit the peculiar Italian institutional
background between the end of WWII and the fall of the Berlin wall. At the beginning of this
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period, known in journalistic and political jargon as the First Republic, a completely new political
system emerged: the end of the Fascist dictatorship led the way to a political system grounded
on five political parties sharing an anti-communist stance and ruling for the whole period. The
stability of such a scenario was essentially based on the Cold War and on the fear that the Italian
Communist Party, the strongest among Western countries, could win regular elections and come
into power. Then, during the first part of the nineties, this system suddenly collapsed. The fall of
the Berlin wall made the Communist threat obsolete, mitigating the political pressures to keep the
ruling parties in power. Shortly after, a massive judicial investigation into political corruption of
the governing parties induced a sharp change in the political élites.
Against this historical background, we investigate the impact of political connections on pop-
ulation growth at city level. We select population as the dependent variable because it reflects
economic growth in small areas and has the advantage of being available and consistently mea-
sured over a long estimation window.1 Then, we define the set of powerful politicians as prime
ministers and leaders of the five parties in power between 1948 and 1992 and investigate whether
municipalities in their areas of birth experienced stronger population growth over the forty-year
period of the First Republic with respect to untreated municipalities with similar characteristics at
the beginning of the period. Particularly, we focus on small- and medium-sized cities, to avoid po-
tential confounders influencing population growth in large metropolitan areas, such as rural-urban
migration, human capital spillovers, etc., and regress changes in population between 1951 and 1991
against a treatment dummy and a vector of municipal characteristics observed in 1951. To pro-
vide a correct comparison between treated and control municipalities, we exclude from the control
group the municipalities with the lowest predicted probability of receiving the treatment according
to past population growth, sectoral composition of the local economy, geographic, demographic
and socio-economic variables. Reverse causality issues are limited by the peculiar historical facts
leading to the onset of the First Republic. Indeed, before the fall of the Fascist dictatorship it
was impossible to forecast the economic boom of the ’50s and ’60s and was even more difficult to
forecast which political parties would have gained momentum.
Our findings indicate the existence of a sizeable connection premium, equal to 8% over 40 years
(18% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable). The impact is larger in municipalities
that are connected to politicians with longer duration as elected members of Parliament and closer to
the municipalities of birth of these politicians. A number of sensitivity checks regarding the selection
of the sample, the clustering of standard errors, the potential role of outliers, and the estimation
1Ideally, one would like to observe the impact on city-level GDP but, unfortunately, this is not available as in
almost any country. On the other hand, population is a well celebrated proxy for local economic growth (e.g. Roback,
1982; Hanlon and Heblich, 2020).
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method reassure as to the robustness of our core result. Our second finding is about persistence.
The abrupt end of the treatment period in the first part of the nineties allows us to study persistence
in the following 20 years, from 1991 to 2011. The difference in population growth between treated
and control municipalities fades until it disappears, while the difference in levels of population
accumulated in the previous forty years remains stable. This suggests that the benefits provided by
the political connections are not permanent, even though the levels of population may be sluggish
in reverting to their original path, probably because the capital stock created may depreciate quite
slowly over time. This conclusion is reinforced by the existence of structural changes in the local
economies of connected municipalities. We find that treated municipalities experienced improved
economic prosperity at the end of the period: at the sunset of the First Republic, they showed
greater industrialization (but not in the high-tech sectors), higher wages and employment rates.
The downside was a toll on some private sector activity: the share of entrepreneurs out of the total
number of workers was lower. Interestingly, after the connection ended, these structural differences
slowly disappeared. Also, when investigating the mechanisms behind such results, we find that
connected areas disproportionally benefitted from the post-WWII development of the transport
network and that state-owned enterprises were more likely to be located in their neighborhoods.
Finally, after documenting the local advantages deriving from political connections, we complete
the overall picture by turning to nationwide allocative considerations. Having favored some areas at
the expense of others does not necessarily point to economic inefficiency. For example, politicians
might have better inside information about the existence of higher agglomeration economies in
their hometowns. At the same time, the blocked political system and the fact that politicians were
destined to remain in power for a long time might have favored forward-looking political choices.
Under these conditions, moving population and economic activity to connected places would have
led to higher aggregate output. To check for this possibility, we test whether connected cities
displayed higher agglomeration economies. We find that this is not the case.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview
of the related literature, while the political landscape of the First Republic is described in Section
3. Section 4 provides the building blocks of our empirical analysis. In Section 5 we present the
empirical results on the connection premium and on its persistence. Further evidence on other
economic outcomes and on the underlying mechanisms is shown in Section 6. Section 7 illustrates
that the benefits from connections were localized and did not contribute to nationwide economic
growth. Finally, Section 4.3 provides some concluding remarks.
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2 Literature review
Our paper is mainly related to the literature on the impact of political connections at city level.
The two nearest papers are Hodler and Raschky (2014) and Asher and Novosad (2017). The former
studies a large global panel dataset with more than 38,000 subnational regions in the 1992-2019
period and find that the hometowns of political leaders experience systematically higher nighttime
light intensity than other locations. However, their results are fully driven by countries in Asia
and Africa. The latter focuses on more than 4,000 legislative constituencies in India between 1990
and 2015 and show that political connections favor higher private sector employment, higher share
prices of firms, and increased nighttime lighting.2
We add to the existing studies in several ways. First, we show that the growth premium holds
also in an advanced economy. Second, our results are based on a longer time span, so that the
result is more likely to capture the steady state spatial equilibrium. Third, the special features of
the First Republic allow us to perform a persistence analysis that, to the best of our knowledge, is
totally new. Fourth, this is the first paper exploring the inefficiency of the politically biased spatial
allocation of resources across cities.
This paper is also related, to a lesser extent, to those papers documenting larger payoffs in
terms of public spending, infrastructures, SOEs, etc. for cities with political connections. This has
been shown for a variety of countries, featured with different degrees of economic and institutional
development: Italy, (Carozzi and Repetto, 2016; Golden and Picci, 2008), European countries
(Gehring and Schneider, 2018), Norway (Fiva and Halse, 2016), China (Kahn et al., 2020; Chen
et al., 2017), Vietnam (Do et al., 2017), Indonesia (Gonschorek et al., 2018). Our additional
contribution to these works consists in providing new evidence that political connections induce
the construction of more infrastructures and increase the likelihood of SOE allocation.
Finally, we also speak to two other streams of the literature. First, a fundamental issue in urban
economics and in economic geography is examining why the spatial distribution of economic activity
is uneven. While natural advantages and agglomeration economies are important explanations,
historical shocks with long-lasting effects may also play a relevant role (Rosenthal and Ross, 2015;
Schumann, 2014). In this respect, we emphasize that political favoritism towards places of birth
is an important historical determinant, since political decisions such as the route of a highway or
the location of a state enterprise have profound consequences on the location choices of companies
and households. Second, our findings are also of interest for the political economy literature, which
mainly analyzed the consequences of political connections at the firm- (e.g. Knight, 2006; Fisman,
2A formally similar but conceptually very different line of research deals with political favoritism stemming from
ethnic proximity (e.g. Burgess et al., 2015; Dickens, 2018; Dreher et al., 2019).
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2001; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Cingano and Pinotti, 2013) or
household-level (Gagliarducci and Manacorda, 2020). We point out that analyzing the consequences
of direct links at the firm or household level is not enough to capture the whole effect of political
connections on economic outcomes: the impact of non-rival public goods (e.g. highways) and of
private goods with local spatial spillovers (e.g. SOEs) calls for an aggregate area-level analysis.
3 The political landscape
The Italian political era referred to as First Republic spanned the period between the first general
elections of the newborn Republic in 1948 and the first years of the nineties. It provides us with
a very favorable setting to investigate the long-term effects of political connections. After having
experienced the Fascist dictatorship, with the end of WWII the country designed its new repub-
lican democratic institutions with the election of a Constituent Assembly in 1946, who wrote the
new constitution. The first Parliamentary elections were held in 1948. From then on and for the
next 40 years, the political system featured a high degree of stability, with five parties in power
at the national level. The Christian Democratic party (Democrazia Cristiana – DC), whose vote
share was about 37% over the 1953-1992 period, was the hub of the system. The other four minor
parties were the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano – PSI, 11.9%), the Italian Social
Democratic Party (Partito Social-Democratico Italiano – PSDI, 4.2%), the Italian Liberal Party
(Partito Repubblicano Italiano – PLI, 3.4%), and the Italian Republican Party (Partito Repub-
blicano Italiano – PRI, 2.8%). Political stability was favored by the existence of the Cold War
and the strength of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano – PCI, 26.8%), the
largest Communist party in Western advanced countries. Supported by the US, there was a tacit
agreement to prevent the PCI from running the national government (the so called conventio ad
excludendum – agreement for exclusion). The electoral system in place, which featured propor-
tional representation, was also pivotal to reduce party turnover. Political stability continued up to
1992, when the Communist threat had vanished and a massive judicial investigation into political
corruption of the ruling parties resulted in the demise of the First Republic and the disappearance
of the five governing political parties (together with their main representatives).
The stability at the party-level was also associated with a very high number of governments (45
between 1948 and 1992) but also with a high degree of permanency for the politicians who held top
positions. In most cases, new governments were just a reshuffling of the same politicians to different
ministries. The most striking case was that of Giulio Andreotti. He was already a member of the
1946 Constituent Assembly and, without interruption, an elected member of Parliament up to
1991 (subsequently, he was appointed senator for life by the President of the Republic). During his
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career, Andreotti was Prime Minister (7 times), Minister of Defense (8), Minister of External Affairs
(5), Minister of State-owned enterprises (3), Minister of Finance, Minister of Economic Planning,
Minister of Industry (2 times each), Minister of the Treasury, Minister of Interior, Minister of
Culture, Minister of European affairs (1 time each). In journalistic jargon, the system was called
“partitocrazia” (meaning “party politics”, in other words that most of the power was in political
parties’ hands), with a lucky few in charge permanently.
At the same time, during the First Republic, the role of the public sector increased significantly.
According to Franco (1993), the public expenditures share of GDP went up from 29% in 1960 to
54% in 1990 (net of debt-service obligations, from 28% to 44%). With a growing public sector, the
influence of politicians was likely to grow. Chronicles referring to that period are full of anecdotal
stories about pork-barrel politics.
Most of them refer to infrastructures, where the utilization of government funds for projects
designed to benefit local residents can be easily traceable. The “Fanfani bend” example does not
stand alone. Another highway going from Rovigo to Trento crossing Vicenza (in the North-East of
the country) was locally named “PiRuBi”, from the surnames of three DC ministers that lobbied
for it: Flaminio Piccoli, Mariano Rumor e Antonio Bisaglia, respectively from Trento, Vicenza and
Rovigo. Ciani et al. (2020) build on the fact that the final path of the Salerno-Reggio Calabria
highway (in the southernmost part of the Italian peninsula) was chosen to pass through Cosenza,
the birthplace of two very influential politicians (Giacomo Mancini, PSI, and Riccardo Misasi, DC),
while two competing coastal routes had been discarded.3
Local favoritism was not limited to roads. Another channel were state-owned firms, which
were a distinctive feature of the Italian post-WWII development process (see, for instance, Morck
and Steier, 2005; Castronovo, 1995). In 1947, the Mechanical Industry Fund was created, later
transformed into EFIM, a public financial holding that managed shareholdings and the financing of
manufacturing firms. The structuring of public intervention in the economy continued with the cre-
ation of a system of monetary incentives targeted to underdeveloped areas (Cassa del Mezzogiorno)
in 1950, and the National Hydrocarbons Authority (ENI, 1953, with the task of coordinating the
3Italy’s roads network provides many additional examples. At the beginning of the seventies, the construction of
the Cassia bis road, near Rome was supposed to serve the private villa of Giovanni Leone, an important DC politician,
next President of the Republic in the 1971-1978 period. The exact path of the highway connecting the Abruzzo region
(Central Italy) to Rome was the reason for a strong dispute between Remo Gaspari and Lorenzo Natali (both from the
DC), as both of them wanted the infrastructure to connect their local constituency, respectively Chieti and L’Aquila.
The highway connecting Naples to Bari (in the South of Italy) was re-directed towards Avellino (leaving Benevento
out of the path) because of the pressure of Fiorentino Sullo, obviously from Avellino. The highway from Genoa to
Gravellona Toce in Piedmont (North-West of the country) was named by local people the “Nicolazzi highway”, from
the name of the PSDI secretary who lobbied for building this infrastructure (and an exit next to his small hometown
of Gattico).
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State’s interventions in the oil industry). Moreover, the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction
(IRI, Istituto per la ricostruzione industriale), founded in 1933 under Fascism, became more and
more pivotal to public intervention in the Italian economy. For instance, it was involved in the
development of the steel industry, the telephone network and the construction of the first and most
important highway (including the “Fanfani bend”). In 1980, the IRI group consisted of about 1,000
companies with more than 500,000 employees. To coordinate the state ownership of the firms a
special Ministry of State Holdings was established (in 1956), which collected all the duties and
the assignments previously attributed in this sector to other ministries and government bodies. In
sum, postwar Italian politicians opted to allocate capital via discretionary industrial policies, rather
than through decentralized market-based mechanisms. Not surprisingly, the SOEs were potentially
a gold mine for influential politicians in need of transferring resources towards their preferred places.
For example, COVEI (COmponenti VEtrari Italiani) and VEM (VEtrerie del Mediterraneo), two
firms that operated in the glass sector and belonged to EFIM, were located in Cosenza, hometown
of the PSI party’s secretary (Giacomo Mancini) in the period 1970-1972. Italtractor (state-owned
tractor producer) had a plant in Potenza, connected to Emilio Colombo, DC Prime Minister from
1970 to 1972. Figure 2 shows the map of the Italian SOE establishments between 1948 and 1991,
including the municipalities within a 10-km radius. It is easy to notice how relevant such a state-
driven industrial policy has been and how important it was for local authorities to attract such
establishments in their electoral basin to foster local employment and welfare.
In the early 1990s, the rising public debt and taxes made industrial policies unsustainable so that
a sweeping privatization program greatly changed the picture. On April 15 1993, the abrogative
referendum of the Ministry of State Holdings obtained a large consensus and, in a couple of years,
many state-owned enterprises were privatized. Overall, historical facts document that during the
First Republic there were many conditions leading to political favoritism: a gridlocked political
system with very limited turnover in political leadership and a relevant role of the State in the
economy. Anecdotal evidence supports the hypothesis that influential politicians were able to
channel public resources towards their cities of birth, for example, by means of the transport
network and the location of SOEs.
4 Empirical framework
In this Section, we first describe how we exploit the institutional background outlined above to
derive our empirical strategy (Subsection 4.1). Then, we define connected cities (Subsection 4.2) and
select the control group to maximize comparability between treated and control units (Subsection
4.3). Data and descriptive statistics are presented in Subsection 4.4. Finally, the regression model
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is illustrated in Subsection 4.5.
4.1 Timing
As outlined in Section 3, the First Republic, spanning from 1948 to 1992, was a very well-defined
political era, which markedly differed from the preceding and the subsequent ones. In our empirical
context, no municipality is treated before 1948. From then on, some cities are treated while other
comparable ones are in the control group. Since the decadal Censuses, which are our main source of
data, are run in the years whose last digit is “1” (see below), we consider 1951, the nearest to 1948,
as the last pre-treatment year. Then, connected municipalities receive the treatment up to 1991
(the closest to 1992, the year of the collapse of the First Republic). This setting would naturally
call for a difference-in-differences empirical design with periods given by decades. However, it is
somehow arbitrary to define the exact year in which the treatment switches on. Given the structure
of the political power during the First Republic, it might be that our politicians were very influential
also before and after their office. As discussed above, even though for some periods politicians were
not officially prime ministers or party leaders, they were likely to manage public resources and to
affect decisions in any case. These considerations translate into our preferred empirical strategy in
which we compare population dynamics between treated and control units over the whole of the
First Republic.
Interestingly, there are two census waves that took place after the collapse of the First Republic,
in 2001 and 2011. This allows us to evaluate whether the impact detected for the treatment period
survives after its end.
4.2 Defining politically connected cities
Our starting point is defining the most powerful political representatives. Hodler and Raschky
(2014) define connected cities as the towns in which prime ministers (or similar) were born. How-
ever, focusing on Italy, we must also acknowledge the importance of the five ruling parties. Indeed,
as discussed in Section 3, the parties in power played a pivotal role in allowing the stability of the
governments in the First Republic. Thus, we consider both the prime ministers and the leaders of
the five parties in power between 1948 and 1992. Overall, in the period considered there were 18
prime ministers and 46 party leaders, corresponding to 57 influential politicians.4 After excluding
2 politicians born abroad, we end up with 55 influential politicians. Then, we remove from the
sample those politicians coming from large cities (above 200,000 inhabitants in 1951) and their
surrounding areas (within a 20-km radius). Indeed, in defining the treated and the control units we
4Seven politicians were both prime ministers and party leaders.
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prefer to avoid considering metropolis, for which there are too many potential confounding factors.5
Finally, we label as politically connected the 33 distinct municipalities of birth of the remaining
politicians. Table 1 displays the names of these politicians and lists the corresponding birthplaces.
In a robustness check, we find that our results are robust to the exclusion of other larger cities,
those above the 99th percentile of the population (about 50,000 inhabitants).6
To account for the possibility of geographical spillovers of the treatment to neighboring munic-
ipalities, we assign the same treatment status to all the municipalities within a 10-km radius from
the birthplaces.7 Indeed, gains accruing from the construction of an infrastructure or the opening
of a new plant of a SOE are likely to benefit not only the target municipality but also all the
surrounding municipalities. We will show that our results are robust to perturbation of this cutoff.
While we are very confident that all the influential politicians according to our definition were
powerful, we cannot rule out the possibility that others, such as members of the Parliament, regional
governors or important ministers who never became prime ministers or party leaders, were powerful
as well. In our view, a clear-cut and undisputable definition of powerful politician does not exist,
and, hence, the assignment of the treatment will always have some degree of measurement error.
A clear advantage of our conservative definition is that the bias potentially embedded in it is a
type-II error, that is we mistakenly consider as not treated some places being treated. Under these
circumstances, our estimates will be a lower bound of the true effect.
Finally, it should be noted that the abrupt change of regime between the fall of the Fascist
dictatorship and the onset of the First Republic prevents the possibility of municipal selection into
the treatment, i.e. municipalities with higher growth potential before 1951 were more likely to
affirm one of their inhabitants as prime minister or political leader. Indeed, as shown in Table
1, more than 90% of our influential politicians were born before the ’30s, when the chance of
predicting future (1951-1991) local growth rates in small- and- medium-sized municipalities was
basically null given the forthcoming World War II. In the next subsection, as further reassurance
regarding selection into the treatment we also check the balance of population growth rates before
1951 between treated and control municipalities.
5For instance, large cities experienced strong population growth in the period considered due to rural-urban
migration. Thus, including them in the treatment group would lead us to overestimate the impact of political
connections on local population growth. Moreover, since wealthy urban environments with higher levels of human
and social capital may be more likely to affirm their political representatives with respect to less educated peripheral
areas, their inclusion may lead to a reverse causality bias. Some scholars have focused on favoritism towards national
capitals or other larger cities (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Davis and Henderson, 2003). However, our empirical choice is
motivated by the fact the we are not interested in the favoritism per se, but in its economic consequences, for which
the political bias effect is likely to be blurred by too many confounders.
6In 1951, at the beginning of the First Republic, the median municipal size was 2,590 inhabitants.
7To put this empirical choice in perspective, 10 km is about the average radius of a local labor market in 2011.
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4.3 Designing a proper control group
Similarly to what we do for the treated units, in designing a control group of municipalities, we
preliminarily exclude from the sample the cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants in 1951. Also,
we exclude the municipalities within a 20-km radius from all the big cities in our sample, since in
the period considered they might have benefited from the agglomeration economies triggered by
their neighboring metropolitan areas. In addition, to account for possible spillovers from treated
to control units, we exclude all the municipalities in a radius between 10 and 20 kilometers from
the politicians’ municipalities of birth (as explained above, municipalities within a 10-km radius
are part of the treated group).
Finally, to credibly identify the effect of political connections on population growth, treated
and control municipalities at the beginning of the First Republic should be similar in terms of their
observable characteristics. If this is not the case, we cannot rule out the possibility of spurious cor-
relations between political connections and population growth. To check for this, Columns (1)-(3)
of Table 2 show the balancing of these characteristics between treated and control municipalities
at the beginning of the period (see below for data description).8 Particularly, we consider the
logarithm of municipal population at the beginning of the period in 1951, the past (1936-1951)
population growth rate, geographic variables, sectoral composition of the local economy, the demo-
graphic composition of the population, the electoral turnout (as a proxy of social capital), the vote
shares for the five ruling parties in power and for the Communist party at the beginning of the
period. It turns out that treated municipalities show (i) higher past population growth; (ii) lower
surface; (iii) lower altitude; (iv) lower probability to be located in Southern Italy (where on average
the quality of institutions is lower); (v) larger share of workers in manufacturing; (vi) higher labor
market participation; (vii) more human capital; (viii) larger turnout at general elections; (ix) larger
vote share for the Communist party.
To address the balancing requirement, we perform a logit regression of the treatment against the
vector of municipal characteristics displayed in Table 2, and drop from the sample the municipalities
in the control group with the lowest predicted probability of being treated. After removing 26% of
municipalities in the control group, all the main characteristics are balanced (Table 2, Columns (4)-
(6)): this is central for the causal interpretation of our estimates. A similar procedure is adopted
by Kline and Moretti (2014a). Note that the balancing condition on the past population growth
reassures that other unobserved variables, such as political connections in the pre-1951 years, are
balanced as well. On the political side, the balancing of the vote shares for both the five ruling
8To ensure comparability across treated and control units, we drop from the sample municipalities with missing
observations in control variables (approx. 300 municipalities).
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parties and the Communist party is crucial to rule out the possibility of systematic correlations
between connected politicians and local political preferences (e.g. politicians of the five ruling
parties coming from areas with stronger preference for their parties or connections endogenously
emerging to contrast the local Communist threat).
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics
Our empirical analysis draws from a number of data sources. Data on party leaders and prime
ministers, as well as their birthplaces, have been hand-collected from Wikipedia and double-checked
with other online resources.
Population data at municipal level come from national censuses, carried out by the Italian
Statistical Institute (Istat). Censuses take place every 10 years on years ending in “1”, with the
only exception of the 1941 census that took place in 1936. The closest year to the beginning of
the First Republic is 1951, while the closest year to its end is 1991. The municipal participation
rate, the share of college educated and the old-to-young population ratio are also taken from
population censuses.9 Data on geographical characteristics are drawn from the Statistical Atlas
of Municipalities provided by Istat, as well as information on municipal altitude and area.10 The
geographical coordinates to compute the distance between municipalities are also provided by Istat.
The share of workers in manufacturing, construction and service sectors are taken from the Istat
Census of Manufacturing and Services. From the latter Census we also draw data on the share of
employers and self-employed workers, as well as municipal plant density and workers per plant in
1991 and in 2011. Data on voter turnout at general elections at the baseline (in 1953) are drawn
from the electoral archive of the Italian Ministry of the Interior. Information about their tenure as
members of Parliament are taken from a database of the “Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti”.
Then, we exploit some additional variables to evaluate the local benefits of political connections
and their persistence after 1991. The share of workers in agriculture, manufacturing and services,
the share of workers in high tech industries, the employment and unemployment rates for 1991
and 2011 all come from “8000 Census”, a national data provider of municipal data managed by
Istat. Data on per capita wages in 1991 and 2011 come from the National Security Database.
Data on roads and railways at the province level come from the Statistical Atlas of Infrastructures,
managed by Istat, while data on plants of state-owned enterprises come from a unique dataset built
by the authors as follows. We start from the list of all Italian main privatizations from 1985, made
available at Privatizationbarometer. For each firm, we hand collect the location of the headquarters
9Participation rates, shares of college educated and old-to-young population ratios are available from 1971 on.
Thus, we imputed 1971 values to 1951 and 1961.
10Municipal surface is available from 1971 on. So, we imputed 1971 values to 1951 and 1961.
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and the plants from Internet. Then, this information is complemented with data taken from (i)
Amatori (2013), (ii) a paper carried out by Mediobanca (an Italian leading investment bank), and
(iii) a list of the companies belonging to the EFIM group provided by the Italian Parliament.11
Finally, for the structural analysis in Section 7, we use 1951-1991 average per capita wages
at the provincial level provided by “Istituto Tagliacarne”. After deflating the nominal values to
account for inflation, we simply assign provincial values to all the corresponding municipalities.
We also compute population density as the ratio between municipal population and surface. Main
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.
4.5 Estimating equation
Our core empirical exercise studies whether politically connected cities experienced higher popula-
tion growth between 1951 and 1991. The baseline regression is:
lnPopm,1991 − lnPopm,1951 = a0 + a1Treatedm + a2Controlsm + εm (1)
where the dependent variable is the log-difference between population in 1991 and in 1951, and
the subscript m denotes municipalities. Treated is a dummy variable equal to 1 for treated units
(as defined above) and 0 otherwise. a1 is the coefficient of interest. Among the controls, we
include all the variables listed in Table 2: the logarithm of municipal population at the beginning
of the period, the 1936-1951 population growth rate, geographic variables, sectoral composition of
the local economy, the demographic composition of the population, the electoral turnout and the
vote shares, all measured in 1951.12 εm is the usual error term. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at municipal level. Estimating the model in first difference ensures
that idiosyncratic municipality-level features are differentiated away, while the balancing of the
pre-treatment population growth guarantees that, before the treatment, treated and control units
were on similar development paths.
5 Main results
We start by presenting our baseline results on population (Subsection 5.1); then, we provide a
full-fledged robustness analysis (Subsection 5.2), while persistence is analyzed in Subsection 5.3.
11References to data sources: privatization barometer: www.privatizationbarometer.com; Mediobanca pa-
per: https://www.mbres.it/sites/default/files/resources/download_it/rs_priv_testo.pdf. The list of EFIM
companies is available upon request from the authors.
12Electoral data refers to 1953.
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5.1 Baseline results
Results on the estimation of Equation (1) are reported in Table 4. Column (1) displays the estimated
coefficient of interest without adding additional controls. The statistically significant coefficient
of 0.088 suggests that on average, during the 40 years of the First Republic, the population of
connected municipalities grew 9% more than the population of control cities. Columns (2) to (6)
show the key estimates after adding alternatively the city-level characteristics described in Table
2. Finally, in Column (7) we add jointly all the covariates. The coefficient of interest is rather
stable across the specifications and amounts to 0.081 in the most demanding one: the connection
premium roughly equals 8% (18% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable). We choose
Column (7) as our baseline specification.
To analyze how the end-of-period 8% difference materializes over time, we run a complete
event study by exploiting the time dimension and introducing time dummies interacted with the
treatment variable. The first year in which connected municipalities are treated is 1961, while we
exclude 1951 to avoid perfect collinearity. We estimate the following equation:







+ β2Controlsm,t + Tt + ϕm + νm,t
(2)
where t is equal to Census years; Tt and ϕm denote year and municipality fixed effects, respectively;
Controlsm,t include all the control variables in Table 2 measured at 1951 interacted for year dum-
mies while νm,t is the usual error term. As shown in the Figure 3, which reports the estimated β1,ts,
treated municipalities do not display any different trend before the treatment. On the contrary,
the effect is positive and statistically significant in 1961 and keeps growing afterwards, reaching its
maximum in 1991 (0.088, fully in line with the baseline estimates). These results also suggest that
our core estimate is robust to an alternative estimation strategy, based on a difference-in-differences
setting.
Table 5 looks at the heterogeneous effects. In Column (1), we augment our baseline specification
by adding an interaction between the treatment term and a dummy variable for municipalities in
the South. In this area, favoritism may be stronger because of weaker institutions and lower social
capital (Putnam, 1993). It turns out that this is the case: the estimated effect is around 7% in
the Centre-North, 12% in the South. In Column (2) we analyze what happens when moving from
the birthplace of influential politicians outwards of the 10-km-radius circle of treated units. We
define two indicators for, respectively, municipalities above (farther) and below (closer) the median
distance from the center of the treated area. The magnitude for the closer ones is twice that of
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the farther ones. The last two columns investigate the moderating role of a politician’s salience,
proxied by the years spent as member of Parliament (Column 3), or by the number of Google
citations (Column 4): taken together, the two pieces of evidence suggest that the more powerful
the politician, the larger the connection premium.
5.2 Robustness checks
The first six rows of Table 6 report sensitivity checks for some empirical choices. We start by
analyzing the robustness of our findings with respect to the use of the 200,000-inhabitant threshold
to remove big cities from the sample: we drop all the municipalities above the 99th percentile of
the 1951 municipal population distribution (along with their neighboring municipalities within a
10-km radius). This is equivalent to decreasing the threshold to 50,000 inhabitants. We find that
the impact increases to 11%, while remaining highly significant (Row 1). Row (2) shows that our
core result is confirmed after trimming the dependent variable at the 1-99 percentiles to check
whether outliers drive the point estimate. In Row (3) we rerun our regression after cutting 30%
of the control municipalities with the lowest predicted probability of being treated (it was 26% at
the baseline).13 The core result nicely survives. Row (4) provides robustness with respect to the
distance to hometowns that we use to label municipalities as treated. In this experiment, we consider
as treated those municipalities within a 15-km radius (instead of 10 km) and we exclude from the
sample municipalities between 15 and 30 kilometers (10-20 km in the baseline). Again, results are in
line with the main estimates. The next two exercises are about the definition of the most powerful
politicians. In Row (5), we assume they are only prime ministers, while municipalities connected
to party leaders are excluded from the sample. This way, our definition of connection is in line with
that in Hodler and Raschky (2014)’s paper. The estimated premium is statistically significant and
slightly higher with respect to the baseline. The specular exercise is shown in Row (6), in which
only cities connected to party leaders are treated while those linked to prime ministers are out of
the sample. Again, we detect a connection premium. Thus, in our sample, prime ministers are not
the only politicians that are able to give rise to benefits for their hometowns.
To account for the potential spatial correlation of the error terms, Rows (7) and (8) report
alternative clustering procedures for the standard errors, respectively clustering at the province-level
and considering municipalities within a 10-km radius. In both cases, the precision of our estimates
diminishes significantly (the standard error goes from 0.019 to 0.037 and 0.028, respectively), while
remaining within the conventional limits. Finally, we adopt different estimation methods. In
13We also try with a sample in which 20% of the municipalities with the lowest predicted probability of being
treated are trimmed. Results were still there. However, note that in the baseline estimates, we choose the threshold
of 26% because it is the minimal threshold at which municipal characteristics are balanced.
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this way, we can show the robustness of our core result to alternative weighting strategies of the
control units. Particularly, we first consider propensity score matching, that weights observations
in the control group according to the probability of receiving the treatment given the observable
characteristics Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Then, we consider the Oaxaca-Blinder estimator.
As shown by Kline (2011), this estimator is simply a propensity score reweighting estimator with
superior properties with respect to the propensity score matching in terms of robustness to the
assumptions underlying the estimation (see the original paper for further details). The coefficient
estimated with the first method is presented in Row (9), while the second one is presented in
Row (10). Both regressions show coefficients fully in line with our core result, suggesting that the
selected municipalities in the control group are sufficiently similar to the treated ones and that our
OLS estimates provide a good approximation regardless of which control municipalities are given
more weight.
Our last concern is about the possibility that our estimates may be driven by some specific
municipalities. To test for this, we run a simulation exercise in which at each draw we exclude from
the sample 5 birthplace cities randomly chosen (along with their neighboring municipalities) and
re-estimate the model. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times. The kernel density of the estimated
coefficients is presented in Figure 4. The vertical dashed line indicates the average of the estimated
coefficients, which is equal to 0.081 (standard error = 0.021), the same point estimate we have in
Table 4 (Column 6). The mass under the kernel density curve is concentrated around the mean
value and does not present unwarranted peaks in other parts of the distribution. This suggests that
the effect of political connections comes quite evenly from all the treated municipalities.
5.3 Persistence
A nice feature of our setting is that we can observe local economies for 20 years after the collapse
of the First Republic, from 1991 to 2011. In Table 7, which is analogous to Table 4, we re-estimate
Equation (1) with the dependent variable equal to ln (Popm,2011)− ln (Popm,1991). The connection
premium vanishes in all the specifications, even if we control for political connections related to the
new political élite that came into power after 1992 (Column 8).
Extending the event study to 2011 confirms that the connection premium earned during the
First Republic stabilizes after 1991. This event study confirms that the differential speed of local
growth for treated units gradually fades away (Figure 5).
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6 Further results
In this Section, we explore how political connections shape structural changes (Subsection 6.1) and
provide some evidence on transmission channels (Subsection 6.2).
6.1 Structural change
Thus far, we have shown that connected municipalities earn a sizeable connection premium in terms
of population. We now investigate the specific changes induced by the political connections on the
local economies, using as depend variables a number of other economic outcomes. Namely, we run
a number of regressions of the following type:
ym = γ0 + γ1Treatedm + γ2Controlsm + ξm (3)
where ym is the outcome of interest measured in 1991, at the end of the treatment period, or
in 2011, that is 20 years later, to see whether some persistence in the same outcome is at work.
Controlsm, measured in 1951, and Treatedm are as above, while ξm is the error term. Note that,
differently from Equation (1), the lack of available data on the dependent variable referring to
1951 (or to previous years) prevents us from systematically controlling for its beginning-of-period
value or for its past dynamics. This might undermine a neat causal interpretation of the estimated
γ1. However, the resulting conditioned correlations are suggestive anyway, thanks to the balancing
properties of the observable characteristics at 1951 shown in Table 2 that account for a non-
negligible part of unobserved heterogeneity. Results for the estimates of γ1 are reported in Table 8,
in which the dependent variable is measured in 1991 (Column 1) or in 2011 (Column 3). At the end
of the First Republic (Column 1), the birthplaces of influential politicians and their surroundings
featured higher levels of economic development compared with their unconnected counterparts. The
structure of the local economies was tilted more towards manufacturing (but not towards high tech
sectors), to the detriment of agriculture, while the weight of the service sector did not differ from
that prevailing in the control municipalities. The density of industrial plants was higher. Firms
were larger, workers received higher wages and a greater number of local residents were employed.
On the other hand, the share of private entrepreneurs out of total workers was smaller, compared
to the group of control units.
Very interestingly, Column (3) shows that, 20 years after the treatment is turned off, most of
these advantages have disappeared (wages and plant size) or are significantly fewer: the degree
of industrialization has halved, as well as the employment rate, and unemployment is now higher.
Higher plant density persists, probably because the capital stock is sticky, but the average plant size
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is now undistinguishable between treated and control units. On the other hand, the displacement
effect on private entrepreneurship is still in place. The evidence of a glorious past has lost intensity.
Overall, the evidence in Table 8 is fully consistent with theoretical insights from Acemoglu
et al. (2006). They develop a model showing that at an earlier stage of development, when a
country is far away from the technology frontier, government interventions can be useful to overcome
market failures. However, as the economy approaches the world technology frontier, new market-
friendlier policies and institutions are needed, while direct public intervention becomes a burden
for sustaining further development. Our findings are also consistent with research carried out by
economic historians, who have argued that the pervasive public intervention in the Italian economy
was able to give the big push (which was more intense in treated areas) while the country was
lagging behind. At the same time, that development model was unfit after the nineties, in a new
scenario featured by globalization, the information and communication revolution, the adoption of
the Euro (Calligaris et al., 2016).
6.2 Mechanisms
In this subsection, we complete the picture by presenting some descriptive evidence on transmission
channels. As depicted in Section 3, anecdotal evidence suggests that our results might mainly
reflect two types of advantages provided by political connections: infrastructure investments and
localization of state-run firms. We now provide some descriptive evidence in this regard. In Table
9, we estimate variations of Equation (3) with different dependent variables. Column (1) shows
that the length of highways, national, regional and provincial roads per square kilometer measured
in 1996 (first year of available data) was significantly greater in connected areas. Column (2)
provides similar evidence with reference to railway density. We also use our data on the plants
of state-owned enterprises to investigate the probability of having a SOE in the neighborhood of
treated municipalities. The dependent variable in Column (3) is a dummy variable that takes on
the value of 1 if the municipality is within a 10-kilometer radius from a SOE. The experiment of
Column (4) is similar to that of Column (3) but excludes utility companies, for which there may be
less discretion in the spatial allocation. This evidence strongly suggests that the anecdotal stories
depicted in Section 3 also have a factual base.14 Overall, the connection premium in terms of
infrastructures and SOEs is fully consistent with the industrialization results in Table 8. Results
in Tables 8 and 9, taken together, support the idea that politicians can manipulate economic
14Our results are consistent with Golden and Picci (2008), who studied Italian provinces during the same period.
They argue that in the context of openlist proportional representation, the governing parties were not able to discipline
their own members sufficiently to target the parties’ areas of core electoral strength, rather than powerful politicians’
areas of reference. Not surprisingly, the paper documents that the geographical distribution of public investments
depended on connection with powerful politicians.
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variables. In our case study, politicians seem to have pushed SOEs to engage in over employment
and above-market wages, probably in order to have greater political support (Shleifer and Vishny,
1994). To further investigate this issue, Figure 6 shows an event study depicting the differential
increase in the logarithm of employment in manufacturing in treated and control municipalities
over time. Unfortunately, data on employment in manufacturing are only available as of 1951 and
thus it is not possible to check for parallel trends before that. Again, we control for all the variables
measured at 1951 listed in Table 2 interacted for year fixed-effects. Omitting 1951 to avoid perfect
collinearity, the figure shows a dramatic increase in the level of employment in manufacturing in
treated municipalities. The figure also shows that employment in manufacturing grew up to the
’80s and stabilized afterwards.
7 General equilibrium effects
While during the First Republic powerful politicians generated benefits for connected cities, the
nationwide effect remains unclear. If the connection simply reallocates resources across space, the
overall impact might be null, or even negative if, for instance, agglomeration externalities spurred
by infrastructures and SOEs were higher in unconnected cities. To address this crucial point, we
borrow from Kline and Moretti (2014a), who propose a spatial equilibrium model to empirically
test whether allocating resources to a given area is optimal from a nationwide perspective. To our
aim, the interesting features of their model are the nature of agglomeration forces, working through
externalities on productivity, and the minimal data requirements.15
Italian municipalities are modelled as small open economies with perfectly mobile capital and
labor over the 10-year Census horizon. Municipalities are price takers on capital, labor, and output
markets. Workers have also homogeneous tastes so that utility is equalized across municipalities.
In each municipality, output is obtained combining labor, capital and a fixed factor by means of
a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale multiplied by a shifter that represents
the total factor productivity (TFP). Political connections have a double effect on local TFP: (i) a
direct one (e.g. a new road), and (ii) an indirect one through agglomeration economies. Indeed, the
increase in TFP generated by the direct effect translates into higher local wages that, in turn, attract
additional workers so obtaining a second-round gain in productivity via greater worker density, i.e.
agglomeration.16 If the marginal productivity of labor is equalized across municipalities, it is
15In other models the main source of agglomeration are agglomeration economies in consumption (Kline and
Moretti, 2014b): increases in local income induce greater demand for goods and thus more economic development.
However, such models are better suited to explain agglomeration externalities in the non-tradeable sector. Since in
our context the main source of agglomeration are infrastructures and the diversion of SOEs in the manufacturing
sector, we prefer to rely on a model encompassing externalities on the production side.
16Greater worker density is traditionally associated with gains in productivity because it allows for positive spillover
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possible to show that moving labor from municipality i to municipality j raises total (nationwide)
output if and only if the agglomeration elasticity (i.e. the elasticity of local productivity with
respect to the local density) is larger in j (see Kline and Moretti, 2014a for further details). Thus,
if the agglomeration elasticity is constant across municipalities, there is no aggregate gain from
reallocating a worker from one community to another. In order to bring this result to the data,
Kline and Moretti (2014a) use a dynamic panel approach. We adapt their model to our empirical
framework and subdivide the sample in splines according to the distribution of the logarithm of
municipal density in 1951. In this way, we can ascertain whether the elasticity of agglomeration
is constant over different density levels. Then, we derive the following estimating equation, which
tests whether agglomeration elasticity varies with population density:




























+ δ4Treatedm + δ5Controlsm,1951 + Tt + ωm,t
(4)
where w are wages, proxied by per capita GDP at the province level (see Section 4.4), R is the
municipality area, Controls include all the control variables listed in Table 2 measured at 1951,
the logarithm of municipal density in 1951 and provincial time trends, T are time fixed effects, ω
is the error term, and the rest of the notation is as above. The key feature of Equation (4) is the
presence of the gi(.), i = 1, 2, 3, which are spline functions defined as follows:
gk(x) =
{
min (lnx, ln q1) if k = 1
min (lnx− ln qk−1, ln qk − ln qk−1)1[x > qk−1] if k > 1
(5)
where qk are spline knots.
17 The parameters of interest are the spline coefficients δ1, δ2 and δ3 that
capture the indirect effect of the connection at “low”, “medium” and “high” density, respectively. In
terms of the theoretical predictions of the model, if these three parameters are statistically indistin-
guishable from each other, there is no evidence that the political connections are output-improving
at the nationwide level. If they are not, we will check whether treated units are disproportionally
effects, such as better employer-employee matches, positive externalities from human capital, etc.
17Following Kline and Moretti (2014a), we choose knots according to the percentiles in the 1951 logarithm of
municipal density distribution that makes the variation in the first difference of each spline component over our
sample period approximately the same. We have q1 = 4.2, q2 = 5.2, q3 = ∞, corresponding respectively to the 18th
and 62nd percentiles of the 1951 distribution of the logarithm of municipal population density.
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represented in the most or in the least productive interval. The model is estimated on the panel
of 4,839 municipalities belonging to our sample, observed in four decadal intervals: 1951-1961,
1961-1971, 1971-1981, 1981-1991. Since wages are endogenous to population dynamics, we also
follow Kline and Moretti (2014a) in calibrating the coefficient δ0 to -1.5. Nevertheless, we check
the sensitivity of our results to perturbations of this parameter.
Before moving to the results, we must acknowledge that our estimates of the elasticities of ag-
glomeration may be curbed by serial correlation bias. In other words, since agglomeration induced
by public intervention at some point in time spontaneously generates additional agglomeration in
subsequent periods, we may mistakenly attribute the serial correlation in observations to agglom-
eration forces. This problem may be partially addressed clustering standard errors at municipal
level. However, to properly account for it, Kline and Moretti (2014a) derive an instrumental vari-
able strategy based on lags of population density: the change in population density between periods
t−2 and t−3 should be correlated to the change in population density between t−1 and t−2, but
current population changes should not be correlated with population density twenty years before.
Unfortunately, in our context we incur in a weak instrument problem and this IV strategy is not
viable, probably because of the sharp changes in municipal population induced by the economic
boom of the ’50s and the ’60s.
Results are recorded in Table 10. In the first three columns we change the set of controls, while
the last two columns test whether results are robust to perturbations of the calibrated elasticity
of population with respect to wages. Particularly, in Column (1) we add the control variables
measured at 1951 listed in Table 2, in Column (2) we add the logarithm of population density at
1951, and in Column (3) we add provincial time trends. In the most demanding specification and
with the preferred calibrated parameter for wages of -1.5, the elasticity of agglomeration ranges
between 0.353 in high density municipalities and 0.365 in medium density municipalities, suggesting
that a 10% increase in population density in the previous decade increases the observed population
by 3-4%. More importantly, in all the specifications we cannot reject the null of equal elasticities
of agglomeration across density levels. This means that nationwide output is basically insensitive
to which municipalities receive the transfers in terms of population density. Thus, targeting public
resources to specific areas would not have produced an increase in national output with respect to
alternative targeting schemes.
To better disentangle the elasticities of agglomeration between treated and control municipal-
ities, in our last exercise we slightly move from the theoretically grounded regression in (4) and
modify it to test directly whether connected cities show higher agglomeration elasticity. Namely,
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we estimate the following regression:















+ θ4Controlsm,1951 + Tt + um,t
(6)
where the notation is the same used above, except for u which is the error term. The coefficient
θ1 captures the direct effect of political connections, θ2 is the agglomeration elasticity, while θ3 is
the additional effect of political connections and population density. In practice, this regression is
equivalent to a test for equal means between elasticities of agglomeration in treated and control
municipalities, conditional on control variables at the beginning of the period. The coefficient of
interest is θ3, the interaction term between the treatment and the average elasticity of agglomeration
over density levels: if positive, it means that targeting politicians’ birthplaces increases nationwide
output; if negative, it means that allocating resources according to politicians’ birthplaces decreases
aggregate output. The model is estimated on the sample of Equation (4). Table 11 presents the
results. In all the specifications additional controls are included, as well as decade fixed effects. As
in the previous table, the first three columns show the results for different specifications of controls,
while the last two provide estimates with alternative calibrated coefficients for the elasticity θ0.
In all the specifications, the interaction term between population density and treatment turns out
to be negative, even though imprecisely estimated. Thus, if anything, state-driven investments
in connected municipalities had a negative impact on aggregate productivity and total output,
suggesting suboptimal localization decisions.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we leverage the peculiar features of the Italian First Republic (years 1948-1992)
to document the local benefits of political connections. At the end of the period, municipalities
connected to powerful politicians show a population premium equal to 8 per cent with respect to
control municipalities with similar characteristics at the beginning of the period. Indeed, politi-
cal connections brought advantages for local residents in terms of a larger manufacturing sector,
higher employment and wages, even though they displaced private initiatives. Particularly, the
politicians of the First Republic managed to locate in their territories of reference important nodes
of the transport system and parts of the state industries. However, these benefits did not persist:
after the end of the First Republic, the differential population growth rate faded away and con-
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nected municipalities began to regress to the levels of socio-economic development of the control
municipalities. After 20 years, few signs of the glorious past are still visible.
The lack of persistence in population growth may suggest an inefficient allocation of resources
from a nationwide point of view. To test this hypothesis, we borrow from Kline and Moretti (2014a)
and examine the agglomeration elasticities of Italian municipalities in the period under examination.
Our econometric tests suggest that agglomeration economies were not higher in connected cities
compared to control units, so the idea that politicians had directed resources to the territories in a
far-sighted way can be discarded.
We believe that this study, grounded in the relatively recent Italian history, have more general
and important implications for the future. In recent years, in several Western countries there has
been a renewed attention to the issues of public intervention in the economy, with the idea that the
state should resume a role of direction abandoning the more neutral role of regulator. Our results
suggest caution: in a period of predominant state intervention, the benefits were transient and
asymmetrically distributed over the territory. Also, we are not aware of the costs of such benefits.
Given its inability to generate self-sustaining growth, this system became financially unviable in
the long run and the rising public debt was one of the reasons for its abandonment. Finally, the
displacement of private initiative may pose problems for the subsequent transition to more market-
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Figure 1: Path of the main Italian highway and the “Fanfani bend”
Notes - The highway connecting the city of Milan to Rome was built between 1956 and 1964. The green lines on the map show
the existing highways before its construction in 1956. The red lines on the map show the existing highways at the end of that
period, in 1964. The blue line shows the planned route through Siena.
Source: Authors’ archival research.
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Figure 2: Municipalities with state-owned enterprises and their neighboring municipalities in a
10-km radius
Notes - Dark areas depict municipalities with state-owned enterprises and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius.
Source: Authors’ archival research.
30
Figure 3: Event study
Notes - Logarithm of municipal population regressed on the interaction between treated municipalities and year dummies, year
fixed effects, municipal fixed effects, year dummies interacted with all the control variables at 1951 listed in Table 2. The
reference year is 1951. Treated municipalities are the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in
Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section
4.3. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipal level. 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: ISTAT, Population census - years 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1936, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991; ISTAT, Census of
Manufacturing and Services - year 1951; ISTAT, Statistical Atlas of Municipalities - year 1951; Italian Ministry of Interior,
Electoral Archives - year 1953.
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Figure 4: Simulation exercise
Notes - Simulation of 1,000 treatment effects after removing 5 treated municipalities at random (and their neighboring munici-
palities in a 10-km radius). Treated municipalities are the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in
Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section
4.3. The vertical line corresponds to the mean value of 0.081. The mean of the standard errors is 0.021. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at municipal level.
Source: ISTAT, Population census - years 1951, 1991; ISTAT, Census of Manufacturing and Services - year 1951; ISTAT,
Statistical Atlas of Municipalities - year 1951; Italian Ministry of Interior, Electoral Archives - year 1953.
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Figure 5: Event study - persistence
Notes - Logarithm of municipal population regressed on the interaction between treated municipalities and year dummies, year
fixed effects, municipal fixed effects, year dummies interacted with all the control variables at 1951 listed in Table 2. The
reference year is 1951. Treated municipalities are the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in
Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section
4.3. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipal level. 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: ISTAT, Population census - years 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1936, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011; ISTAT,
Census of Manufacturing and Services - year 1951; ISTAT, Statistical Atlas of Municipalities - year 1951; Italian Ministry of
Interior, Electoral Archives - year 1953.
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Figure 6: Event study - logarithm of manufacturing employment
Notes - Logarithm of manufacturing employment regressed on the interaction between treated municipalities and year dummies,
year fixed effects, municipal fixed effects, year dummies interacted with all the control variables at 1951 listed in Table 2. The
reference year is 1951. Treated municipalities are the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in
Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section
4.3. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipal level. 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: ISTAT, Population census - years 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991; ISTAT, Census of Manufacturing and Services - year
1951; ISTAT, Statistical Atlas of Municipalities - year 1951; Italian Ministry of Interior, Electoral Archives - year 1953.
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Table 1: List of connected municipalities
Name Party Role Year Municipality Province Region Area
birth
Altissimo Renato PLI Party leader 1940 Portogruaro Venezia Veneto NE
Biasini Oddo PRI Party leader 1917 Cesena Forĺı-Cesena Emilia-R. NE
Biondi Alfredo PLI Party leader 1928 Pisa Pisa Toscana CE
Cappi Giuseppe DC Party leader 1883 Castelverde Cremona Lombardia NW
Cariglia Antonio PSDI Party leader 1924 Vieste Foggia Puglia SO
Chiostergi Giuseppe PRI Party leader 1889 Senigallia Ancona Marche CE
Colombo Emilio DC Prime minis. 1920 Potenza Potenza Basilicata SO
Cossiga Francesco DC Prime minis. 1928 Sassari Sassari Sardegna SO
De Gasperi Alcide DC Both 1881 Pieve Tesino Trento Trentino-A A. NE
De Mita Ciriaco DC Both 1928 Nusco Avellino Campania SO
Fanfani Amintore DC Both 1908 Pieve Santo Stefano Arezzo Toscana CE
Forlani Arnaldo DC Both 1925 Pesaro Pesaro-Urbino Marche CE
Gonella Guido DC Party leader 1905 Verona Verona Veneto NE
Goria Giovanni DC Prime minis. 1943 Asti Asti Piemonte NW
Jacometti Alberto PSI Party leader 1902 San Pietro Mosezzo Novara Piemonte NW
Mancini Giacomo PSI Party leader 1916 Cosenza Cosenza Calabria SO
Mondolfo Ugo Guido PSDI Party leader 1875 Senigallia Ancona Marche CE
Moro Aldo DC Both 1916 Maglie Lecce Puglia SO
Nenni Pietro PSI Party leader 1891 Faenza Ravenna Emilia-R. NE
Nicolazzi Franco PSDI Party leader 1924 Gattico Novara Piemonte NW
Orlandi Flavio PSDI Party leader 1921 Canino Viterbo Lazio CE
Pella Giuseppe DC Prime minis. 1902 Valdengo Biella Piemonte NW
Piccioni Attilio DC Party leader 1892 Poggio Bustone Rieti Lazio CE
Reale Oronzo PRI Party leader 1902 Lecce Lecce Puglia SO
Romita Giuseppe PSDI Party leader 1887 Tortona Alessandria Piemonte NW
Rumor Mariano DC Both 1915 Vicenza Vicenza Veneto NE
Scelba Mario DC Prime minis. 1901 Caltagirone Catania Sicilia SO
Segni Antonio DC Prime minis. 1891 Sassari Sassari Sardegna SO
Simonini Alberto PSDI Party leader 1896 Reggio nell’Emilia Reggio Emilia-R. NE
nell’Emilia
Sommovigo Amedeo PRI Party leader 1891 La Spezia La Spezia Liguria NO
Tambroni Fernando DC Prime minis. 1901 Ascoli Piceno Ascoli Piceno Marche CE
Tanassi Mario PSI Party leader 1916 Ururi Campobasso Molise SO
PSDI Party leader
Terrana Emanuele PRI Party leader 1923 Ardore Reggio di Calabria SO
Calabria
Vigorelli Ezio PSDI Party leader 1892 Lecco Lecco Lombardia NW
Villabruna Bruno PLI Party leader 1884 Santa Giustina Belluno Veneto NE
Zaccagnini Benigno DC Party leader 1912 Faenza Ravenna Emilia-R. NE
Zoli Adone DC Prime minister 1887 Cesena Forĺı-Cesena Emilia-R. NE
Notes - Political parties: DC - Christian Democratic Party; PSI - Socialist Party; PRI - Republican Party; PSDI - Social-
democratic Party; PLI - Liberal Party. List of Italian regions included in each geographic area: North-West (NW) includes Valle
d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria and Lombardia; North-East (NE) includes Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and
Emilia-Romagna; Centre (CE) includes Toscana, Marche, Umbria and Lazio; South (SO) includes Abruzzo, Molise, Campania,
Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna.
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Table 2: Sample characteristics - municipal level, year 1951
Whole sample Trimmed sample
Treated Control P-value Treated Control P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log population 7.93 7.91 0.785 7.92 7.90 0.763
Pop. growth 1936-51 0.06 0.05 0.066 0.06 0.06 0.307
South 0.26 0.34 0.004 0.26 0.28 0.631
Altitude 0.21 0.23 0.089 0.21 0.21 0.785
Area 32.3 40.6 0.003 32.3 30.4 0.302
Municipal size 1.99 2.01 0.689 1.99 2.02 0.573
Share of workers in manufacturing 0.50 0.46 0.000 0.50 0.50 0.378
Share of workers in construction 0.07 0.07 0.212 0.07 0.06 0.660
Share of workers in private services 0.43 0.46 0.000 0.43 0.44 0.305
Labor market participation 0.49 0.48 0.042 0.49 0.49 0.719
Share of college educated 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.113
Ratio pop. over 65 / pop. under 15 0.74 0.72 0.394 0.74 0.73 0.690
Turnout at national elections 0.94 0.92 0.000 0.94 0.94 0.626
Share votes 5 parties in power 0.68 0.68 0.512 0.68 0.69 0.231
Share votes Communist party 0.19 0.17 0.004 0.19 0.19 0.691
Observations 357 6,058 357 4,482
Notes - Average characteristcs of treated and control municipalities. Treated municipalities are the municipalities of birth
of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control
municipalities are defined as discussed in Section 4.3. The trimmed sample is obtained after dropping the 26% of control
municipalities with the lowest predicted probability of receiving the treatment. Log population is the logarithm of municipal
population. Population growth 1936-1951 is the difference between the logarithm of population in 1951 and 1936. South is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities in Southern Italy. Southern regions are: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Basilicata,
Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna. Altitude is a continuous variable obtained projecting the difference between the maximum
and minimum altitude of the municipality on municipal surface. Area is the surface of the municipality in squared kilometers.
Municipal size ranges between 1 and 3 and refers to the terciles of population distribution. Share of workers in manufacturing,
Share of workers in construction, Share of workers in private services are the shares of workers in manufacturing, construction
and private services. We do not have information on workers in the public sector at 1951. Labor market participation is the
share of workers out of municipal population. Share of college educated is the share of population with college education. Ratio
pop. over 65/pop. under 15 is the ratio between municipal population over 65 years old and municipal population below 15
years old. Turnout at national elections is the share of voters at national elections (for lower chamber) in 1953. Share votes
5 parties in power is the sum of the share of votes of the 5 parties in power at national elections (for lower chamber) in 1953:
the Christian Democratic party, the Italian Socialist party, the Italian Social Democratic party, the Italian Liberal party, and
the Italian Republican party. Share votes Communist party is the share of votes of the Italian Communist party at national
elections (for lower chamber) in 1953.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Year Unit Mean Std. Dev. Observations Source
Baseline results and controls at 1951 - Tables 4 to 9
Population 1951 Ln(units) 7.910 0.990 4,839 Istat
Population growth 1951-1991 Ln(units) -0.105 0.460 4,839 Istat
Population growth 1936-1951 Ln(units) 0.056 0.132 4,839 Istat
Treated 1951 Dummy 0.074 0.261 4,839 Wikipedia
Municipal size 1 1951 Dummy 0.317 0.465 4,839 Istat
Municipal size 2 1951 Dummy 0.349 0.477 4,839 Istat
Municipal size 3 1951 Dummy 0.334 0.472 4,839 Istat
South 1951 Dummy 0.274 0.446 4,839 Istat
Altimetry 1951 Km 0.206 0.198 4,839 Istat
Surface 1951 Sq-Km 30.53 33.24 4,839 Istat
Workers in manufacturing 1951 Shares 0.497 0.177 4,839 Istat
Workers in construction 1951 Shares 0.064 0.094 4,839 Istat
Workers in services 1951 Shares 0.438 0.167 4,839 Istat
Participation rate 1951 Shares 0.491 0.062 4,839 Istat
College education 1951 Shares 0.007 0.005 4,839 Istat
Ratio old/young population 1951 Units 0.730 0.543 4,839 Istat
Voters’ turnout 1953 Shares 0.938 0.043 4,839 Ministry of Interior
Votes parties in power 1953 Shares 0.691 0.148 4,839 Ministry of Interior
Votes Communist party 1953 Shares 0.191 0.135 4,839 Ministry of Interior
Persistence analysis - Table 7
Population growth 1991-2011 Ln(units) 0.047 0.205 4,839 Istat
Politicians II republic 1991 Dummy 0.028 0.166 4,839 Wikipedia
Economic structure in 1991 and 2011 - Table 8
Workers in agriculture 1991 Shares 0.138 0.120 4,839 Istat
2011 Shares 0.088 0.083 4,839 Istat
Workers in manufacturing 1991 Shares 0.395 0.142 4,839 Istat
2011 Shares 0.318 0.109 4,839 Istat
Workers in services 1991 Shares 0.467 0.124 4,839 Istat
2011 Shares 0.593 0.101 4,839 Istat
Workers in high tech 1991 Shares 0.020 0.062 4,697 Istat and OECD
and high human capital 2011 Shares 0.017 0.067 4,697 Istat and OECD
Plants per sq-km 1991 Ln(units) 2.153 1.185 4,839 Istat
2011 Ln(units) 2.286 1.371 4,839 Istat
Workers per plant 1991 Ln(units) 1.160 0.410 4,839 Istat
2011 Ln(units) 1.059 0.406 4,839 Istat
Per capita wages 1991 Ln(euro) 8.817 1.597 4,488 Inps
2011 Ln(euro) 9.918 1.321 4,488 Inps
Employment rate 1991 Shares 0.417 0.084 4,839 Istat
2011 Shares 0.456 0.075 4,839 Istat
Unemployment rate 1991 Shares 0.148 0.115 4,839 Istat
2011 Shares 0.097 0.057 4,839 Istat
Share enterpreneurs 1991 Shares 0.280 0.082 4,839 Istat
2001 Shares 0.258 0.067 4,839 Istat
Mechanisms - Table 9
Provincial road density 1996 ln(km/sq-km) 0.601 0.169 4,839 Istat
Provincial railway density 1996 ln(km/sq-km) 0.086 0.053 4,839 Istat
10-km from SOE 1991 Dummy 0.145 0.353 4,839 Archival sources
10-km from SOE no-utilities 1991 Dummy 0.137 0.344 4,839 Archival sources
Structural analysis - Tables 10 to 11
Wages 1951-1991 Ln(euro) 4.541 2.881 24,195 Istituto Tagliacarne
Population density 1951-1991 Ln(units) 4.837 1.019 24,195 Istat
Notes - Among the data sources, Istat is the Italian National Institute for Statistics and Inps is the National Institute for Social
Security. The share of workers in services has some missing observations because the Census for Manufacturing and Services
did not survey the public sector in 1951. Turnout, share of votes for the parties in power and share of votes for the Communist
party refers to the national elections for the lower chamber.
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Table 4: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated 0.088∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019)
Observations 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839
Impact on sd dep. var. (%) 19.1 16.5 20.9 18.0 19.3 19.8 17.6
Log population No Yes No No No No Yes
Population growth 1936-51 No Yes No No No No Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes No No No Yes
Sectoral composition No No No Yes No No Yes
Demographic controls No No No No Yes No Yes
Voting behavior No No No No No Yes Yes
Notes - The dependent variable is the log-difference between municipal population in 1991 and 1951. The standard deviation
of the dependent variable is 0.460. Treated refers to the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in
Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section
4.3. Control variables are listed in Table 2 and are measured in 1951. Geographic controls include municipal altitude, area and
size and a dummy variable for municipalities in the South. Sectoral composition includes the share of workers in manufacturing
and construction and labor market participation. Demographic controls include the share of population with college education
and the ratio between people above 65 and below 15 years old. Voting behavior includes the turnout, the share of votes to
the 5 parties in power and the share of votes to the Communist party at the 1953 national elections for the lower chamber.
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Observations 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839
Controls at 1951 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes - The dependent variable is the log-difference between municipal population in 1991 and 1951. The standard deviation
of the dependent variable is 0.460. Treated*North refers to the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers
(listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius in the North of Italy. Treated*South is the
interaction between treated and municipalities in the South. Treated*Farther and Treated*Closer are defined according to the
median distance from treated municipalities. Treated*More years and Treated*Less years are defined according to the median
number of years in Parliament of the connected politicians. Finally, Treated*More citations and Treated*Less citations are
defined according to the median number of Google citations of the connected politicians. Control municipalities are defined as
discussed in Section 4.3. Control variables are listed in Table 2 and are measured in 1951. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal level.
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Table 6: Robustness checks
Row Robustness Treated Observations Impact on std.
dev. dep. var. (%)
(1) Without cities > 99th perc. 0.108∗∗∗ 3,735 24.4
(0.024)
(2) Trimming of dep. variable 0.080∗∗∗ 4,788 18.4
(0.018)
(3) Cut sample <30th perc. 0.080∗∗∗ 4,597 17.4
(0.019)
(4) 15 km treatment 0.060∗∗∗ 4,326 12.9
(0.013)
(5) Only prime ministers 0.105∗∗∗ 4,631 22.8
(0.030)
(6) Only party leaders 0.065∗∗∗ 4,759 14.1
(0.019)
(7) Cluster at province 0.081∗∗ 4,839 17.6
(0.037)
(8) Cluster at 10-km radius 0.081∗∗∗ 4,839 17.6
(0.028)
(9) PS Matching (kernel) 0.087∗∗∗ 4,839 18.9
(0.023)
(10) Oaxaca-Blinder 0.082∗∗∗ 4,839 17.8
(0.023)
Controls at 1951 Yes
Notes - The dependent variable is the log-difference between municipal population in 1991 and 1951. In Row (2) the dependent
variable is trimmed at percentiles 1 and 99. In Rows (1)-(3) and (7)-(10), Treated refers to the municipalities of birth of
party leaders and prime ministers (listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. In Row (4)
Treated refers to the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring
municipalities in a 15-km radius. In this regression, the municipalities between 15 and 30 kilometers from the municipality
of birth of a connected politician are removed from the sample. In Row (5) Treated refers to the municipalities of birth of
prime ministers and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. In this regression, the municipalities of birth of
party leaders and their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius are removed from the sample. In Row (6) Treated refers
to the municipalities of birth of party leaders and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. In this regression, the
municipalities of birth of prime ministers and their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius are removed from the sample.
The propensity score matching in Row (9) is run adopting a kernel algorithm. Control municipalities are defined as discussed
in Section 4.3. Control variables are listed in Table 2 and are measured in 1951. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal level.
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Table 7: Persistence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Politicians 2nd Republic 0.012
(0.015)
Observations 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839
Impact on sd dep. var. (%) 4.4 3.9 4.9 4.4 5.8 6.8 5.8 5.4
Log population No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Population growth 1936-51 No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No Yes No No No Yes Yes
Sectoral composition No No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Demographic controls No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Voting behavior No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes - The dependent variable is the log-difference between municipal population in 2011 and 1991. The standard deviation
of the dependent variable is 0.205. Treated refers to the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in
Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section
4.3. Control variables are listed in Table 2 and are measured in 1951. Geographic controls include municipal altitude, area and
size and a dummy variable for municipalities in the South. Sectoral composition includes the share of workers in manufacturing
and construction and labor market participation. Demographic controls include the share of population with college education
and the ratio between people above 65 and below 15 years old. Voting behavior includes the turnout, the share of votes to
the 5 parties in power and the share of votes to the Communist party at the 1953 national elections for the lower chamber.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal
level.
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Table 8: Economic structure in 1991 and 2011
Dependent variable 1991 Impact on std. 2011 Impact on std. Observations
dev. dep. var. dev. dep. var.
1991 (%) 2011 (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share workers agriculture -0.037*** 30.8 -0.019*** 22.9 4,839
(0.005) (0.004)
Share workers manufacturing 0.032*** 22.5 0.012*** 11.0 4,839
(0.006) (0.004)
Share workers services 0.004 3.2 0.007 6.9 4,839
(0.005) (0.005)
Share workers high tech -0.001 1.6 -0.001 1.5 4,697
(0.003) (0.003)
Plants’ density 0.250*** 21.1 0.287*** 20.9 4,839
(0.046) (0.067)
Workers per plant 0.067*** 16.3 0.008 2.0 4,839
(0.021) (0.020)
Per capita wages 0.214*** 13.4 0.089 6.7 4,488
(0.073) (0.062)
Employment rate 0.010*** 11.9 0.006** 8.0 4,839
(0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment rate -0.005** 4.3 0.003* 5.3 4,839
(0.003) (0.002)
Share enterpreneurs -0.033*** 40.2 -0.021*** 31.3 4,839
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls at 1951 Yes Yes
Notes - Each row reports the regression coefficients of a different dependent variable on treated municipalities and a set of control
variables. Column (1) reports the regression results measuring the dependent variables in 1991, while Column (3) reports the
regression results measuring the dependent variables in 2011. Treated municipalities are the municipalities of birth of party
leaders and prime ministers (listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities
are defined as discussed in Section 4.3. The Share of workers in agriculture, manufacturing and services range between 0 and
1. Share workers high tech refers to the share of workers in high technology and high human capital industries, as defined by
OECD. Since not all the municipalities have workers in high technology industries, there are some missing observations. Thus,
we restrict the sample to muincipalities with high technology industries both in 1991 and 2011. Plants’ density is the logarithm
of the number of plants per squared kilometer. Workers per plant is the logarithm of the number of workers per plant in the
municipality. Per capita wages is the logarithm of total monthly wages divided by the population of the corresponding year.
These data come from the National Social Security Institute Database (INPS) collecting data on wages for the universe of
employees. Because of difficulties in data cleaning, we ended up with some missing observations. Thus, we restrict the sample
to municipalities with nonmissing data both in 1991 and 2011. Employment rate and Unemployment rate range between 0 and
1. Finally, Share enterpreneurs is the share of enterpreneurs out of total workers. This value is not available for 2011, and the
coefficient in Column (3) is based on a regression using data at 2001. The standard deviations of the dependent variables are
reported in Table 3. Columns (2) and (4) report the percentage impact of the estimated coefficients on the standard deviations
of the dependent variables. All the regressions include control variables measured in 1951. Control variables are listed in Table




Road Railway 10-km 10-km SOE
density density from SOE (no utilities)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.055∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.003) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839
Impact on sd dep. var. (%) 32.5 34.0 43.1 41.0
Controls at 1951 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes - The dependent variable in Column (1) is the length of highways, national, regional and provincial roads per square
kilometer in 1996. This variable is not available at municipal level and is constructed at provincial level. The dependent variable
in Column (2) is the length of railways per square kilometer in 1996. This variable is not available at municipal level and is
constructed at provincial level. The dependent variable in Column (3) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality is
in a 10-kilometer radius from a state-owned enterprise (SOE). The dependent variable in Column (4) is similar to Column (3)
but excludes utility companies. The standard deviations of the dependent variables are reported in Table 3. Treated refers to
the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in
a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section 4.3. Control variables are listed in Table 2 and are
measured in 1951. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and
clustered at municipal level.
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Table 10: Structural estimates of agglomeration function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low density 0.265∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Medium density 0.301∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
High density 0.287∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021)
Treated 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
P-value equal slopes 0.473 0.375 0.870 0.545 0.696
Observations 19,356 19,356 19,356 19,356 19,356
Wage coefficient 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 2
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls at 1951 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Density at 1951 No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial time trends No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes - The dependent variable is the first difference in the logarithm of municipal population. Low density refers to munic-
ipalities below the 18th percentile of the distribution of the logaritmic municipal density in 1951, Medium density refers to
municipalities between the 18th and the 62nd percentile of the distribution of the logaritmic municipal density in 1951 and
High density refers to municipalities above the 62nd percentile of the distribution of logaritmic municipal density in 1951.
Treated refers to the municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring
municipalities in a 10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section 4.3. Control variables are listed in
Table 2 and are measured in 1951. The wage coefficient is calibrated at 1.5 in Columns (1)-(3), at 1 in Column (4) and at 2 in
Column (5). The 4,839 municipalities in the sample are observed for 4 periods: 1991-1981; 1981-1971; 1971-1961; 1961-1951.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal
level.
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Table 11: Structural estimates of agglomeration function - treated vs control municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log density 0.289∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
Treated 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Treated*Log density -0.043 -0.044 -0.033 -0.024 -0.043
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.041)
Observations 19,356 19,356 19,356 19,356 19,356
Wage coefficient 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 2
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls at 1951 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Density at 1951 No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial time trends No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes - The dependent variable is the first difference in the logarithm of municipal population. Log density is the first
difference in the logarithm of municipal population divided by municipal surface and lagged one decade. Treated refers to the
municipalities of birth of party leaders and prime ministers (listed in Table 1) and all their neighboring municipalities in a
10-km radius. Control municipalities are defined as discussed in Section 4.3. Treated*Log density is an interaction variable.
Control variables are listed in Table 2 and are measured in 1951. The wage coefficient is calibrated at 1.5 in Columns (1)-(3),
at 1 in Column (4) and at 2 in Column (5). The 4,839 municipalities in the sample are observed for 4 periods: 1991-1981;
1981-1971; 1971-1961; 1961-1951. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
robust and clustered at municipal level.
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